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THE THEORY OF "UNCONSCIOUS
TRANSFERENCE": THE LATEST
THREAT TO THE SHIELD LAWS
PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF
VICTIMS OF SEX OFFENSES
FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN, *
 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED **
and ELIZABETH F. Lovrus***
We can all recall situations where we remembered having seen an
individual at, for example, a cocktail party, only to subsequently
discover that he was never there and that what we had remembered
was an earlier party at which the individual was present. This is
an example of the commonly encountered phenomenon of "uncon-
scious transference."
—Professor Lawrence Taylor'
There are unfortunately numerous, well-documented examples of
misidentification by percipient witnesses in criminal cases. 2 In many
cases, the misidentification led to a wrongful convictions In the words
of a distinguished jurist, Judge Carl McGowan, "[T] he vagaries of .. .
identification [have] been thought by many experts to present . . . the
greatest threat to the achievement of our ideal that no innocent man
shall be punished."' The United States Supreme Court has asserted
that "the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken
identification," causing a "high incidence of miscarriage of justice." 1" In
mid-1996, the Justice Department furnished new evidence to support
* Senior Legal Advisor to Judge Crawford, United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces.
** Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.
*** Professor of Psychology, University of Washington.
LAWRENCE TAYLOR, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION § 2-4,3, at 39 (1982).
2 See Felice J. Levine & June Louin Tapp, The. Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap
from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1079, 1081 (1973).
3
 See id. at .1082; see generally EtutitNE B. BLOCK, THE VINDICATORS (1963); EowiN M. Bolt-
CHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); HON. JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NoT
(1957); ERLE S. GARDNER, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT (1952); A.C. RONALD HUFF El' AL.,
CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1988); EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 2801, 927-28 (2d ed. 1903); EDWARD
D. RADON, THE INNOCENTS (1964).
4 See Levine Sc Tapp, supra note 2, at 1081 n.11.
5
 United States v, Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
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the Court's assertion. In June of that year, the Department's National
Institute of Justice released Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science—
case studies of twenty-eight accused individuals, many of whom were
initially convicted on the basis of inaccurate eyewitness testimony but
who were later exonerated by DNA testing.'
At one time, it was assumed that deliberate perjury by witnesses
was the most common cause of inaccurate courtroom testimony.' To-
day, however, the prevailing view is that deliberate insincerity by wit-
nesses plays a minor role in causing testimonial error. 8 In truth, perjury
appears to be relatively rare. 9 As the late Dean Mason Ladd remarked,
"[W]itnesses are more often . . . mistaken than committing perjury.” 10
In general, most testimonial errors are unintentional."
In particular, many testimonial errors are caused by misrecollec-
tion, errors in the witness's memory process. 12 A person's memory is
"one of [his or her] most fallible instruments."" Some claim that
honest errors in memory are "the most important source of testimonial
conflict" at trial."
In several recent criminal cases, the defense counsel have argued
that the star prosecution witnesses committed a specific type of mem-
ory error, namely, "unconscious transference."'" Some of the cases fit
a common pattern. In each case, the accused was charged with a sex
offense. Each accused denied guilt. The accused did not allege that
the complainant was committing perjury. Rather, the accused's posi-
tion was that the complainant was mistaken. Each accused conceded
that he had had some contact with the complainant. However, in each
case, the accused proffered evidence that the complainant had a sexual
1'
	 generally NATIONAL. Irts-rrr. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES,
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE
AFTER TRIAL. (1996).
7 See Edward J. Itnwinkelried, The importance of the Memory Factor in Analyzing the Reliability
of Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson Slowly Learnt—and Quickly Forgotten, 41 FLA. L. REv. 215. 219-22
(1989).
I See Lawrence S. Kubie, Implications for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human Memory,
108 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 59 (1959).
" See id.
11 Mason Ladd, The Hearsay We Admit, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 271, 286 (1952).
II See A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 70 (1979).
12 See Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 224-2H.
13 See Kulne, supra note 8, at 60.
14 See, e.g., 1. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law
and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 1, 9.
16 See, e.g., United States v. Gober, 43 M.J. 52, 59 (C.A.A.F. 1995); Mack v. Cotnmonwealth,
860 S.W.2d 275, 277-78 (K): 1993); Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 507 N.E.2d 684, 689 n.3 (Mass.
1987).
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encounter with a third party and argued that in her mind, the com-
plainant had confused the accused and the real perpetrator. United
States u. Gober is a case in point.' 6 In Gober, the accused stood charged
with committing an indecent act upon a child.''' The accused was the
child's stepfather. 18
 The defense proffered an expert who opined that
although the complainant perhaps correctly recollected that she had
been subjected to sexual abuse, she was erroneously transferring the
detail of the accused's identity to that recollection.''' As a basis for the
opinion, the expert described the child's earlier alleged sexual abuse
by her biological father. 2°
These cases raise several significant evidentiary issues. One issue
is the admissibility of purportedly scientific testimony about the psy-
chological phenomenon of "unconscious transference." 21 Even without
the benefit of expert testimony, in closing argument an attorney may
call the jurors' attention to matters of common knowledge. 22 Thus, a
defense attorney might refer to the common experience mentioned
by Professor Taylor—mistakenly thinking that an acquaintance was at
an event because at the event, the witness noticed someone similar in
appearance to the acquaintance. 2t However, in some of the recent
cases, the defense counsel have not been content to invoke everyday
experience to support their argument. Instead, they have proffered
expert testimony about a general scientific theory of "unconscious
transference."' Does that testimony pass muster under the standards
governing the admissibility of scientific evidence?
Those standards are not the only potential barrier to the intro-
duction of defense testimony about "unconscious transference." As
previously stated, in a number of cases, to support its position, the
defense has endeavored to introduce testimony about the complain-
ant's sexual encounters with third parties. 25
 In many jurisdictions, the
introduction of that type of evidence would fly in the face of the rape
shield statutes protecting the privacy of victims of sexual offenses. 26
11 i43 M.J. at 53.
17 Id.
16
 See id.
19 See id. at 59; see also Mack, 860 S.W.2d at 277; Ruffen, 507 N.E,2d at. 689 n.3,
20 See Col" 43 Mj. at 58.
21 See id. at 59.
22 See generally John Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GE O. L.J. 395 (1985).
25 TAYLOR, supra note 1, § 2-4.3, at 39.
24 See, e.g., Gober 43 Mj. at 59; Mack, 860 S.W.2d at 277; see also Ruffen, 507 N.E.2d at 689
n.3 ("expert testimony or other evidentiary support for the 'transference theory'").
2t See, e.g., Caber, 43 M.J. at 53.
26 FED. R. EVID. 412.
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Those statutes severely restrict the defense's ability to introduce evi-
dence of the victim's sexual history. Does the defense have a viable
argument for surmounting such statutes? For the most part, the rape
shield laws have weathered the constitutional attacks mounted by the
defense bar. 27
 However, in rare cases, the courts have ruled that excul-
patory defense testimony had such compelling probative value that it
trumped a statutory or common-law exclusionary rule of evidence. 28 Is
this new threat, testimony about "unconscious transference," one of
the exceptional types of exculpatory evidence which can override a
rape shield law? A constitutional case can be constructed to mandate
the admission of unconscious transference evidence. In one laboratory
experiment, transference subjects—subjects with prior exposure to an
innocent person—proved to be three times more likely than control
subjects to misidentify the innocent person as the perpetrator. 29
The first section of this article describes the state of the psycho-
logical research into the phenomenon of "unconscious transference."
This section points out that it is critical to differentiate among three
different concepts: the narrow psychological theory of unconscious
transference, the broader umbrella of source monitoring errors and
the clinical notion of transference.
In that light, the second section addresses the question of whether
testimony about the narrow phenomenon of unconscious transference
satisfies the contemporary tests for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. This section initially demonstrates that the testimony is arguably
objectionable under the empirical validation standard announced in
the Supreme Court's 1993 Daubert decision." However, the section also
explains why the testimony might prove admissible in a jurisdiction
committed to the traditional, general acceptance test.
The third section shifts to the broader theory of source monitor-
ing errors. This sort of expert testimony can sometimes collide with
the rape shield laws. This section examines the question of whether,
given the state of the scientific research, testimony about source moni-
toring errors has such powerful probative worth that the rape shield
statutes must yield. After surveying the jurisprudence defining the
27 .See joel E. Smith, Annotation, Constitutionality of "Rape Shield" Statute Restricting Use of
Evidence of Victim's Sexual Experiences, 1 A.L.R.4th 283,287 (1980),
28 See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRLED, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE: THE ACCUSED'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RICITT To INTRODUCE FAVORABLE EVIDENCE § 9-4.b, at 223-33 (1992).
29 See David J. Ross et al., Unconscious Transference and Lineup Identification: Toward a Memory
Blending Approach, in ADULT EYEUTTNESS TESTIMON'e: CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 80,
96 (David F. Ross et al. eds., 1994).
38
 Dauber( v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,589-95 (1993).
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quantum of probative value needed to trigger the accused's implied
Sixth Amendment right to present exculpatory evidence, this section
finds that, in most cases, the source monitoring error theory will fall
short. Further research might well change the scientific record; but
given the current record, the article concludes that the rape shield laws
will ordinarily bar the admission of an opinion about a source moni-
toring error when the opinion is explicitly based on the victim's sexual
history.
I. A DESCRIPTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS TRANSFERENCE THEORY
A. The Theory Proper
In Section II, we shall critically evaluate the research data support-
ing the unconscious transference theory. 3 ' However, the limited pur-
pose of this section is to describe—rather than critique—the theory.
The paradigm of the theory is the classic case of the ticket agent. 32 The
agent worked at a railroad station. He was the victim of an armed
robbery. After the crime, the agent attended a lineup arranged by the
police. At the lineup, the agent picked out a sailor as the robber.
However, further police investigation revealed that the sailor had an
ironclad alibi." An investigator later asked the agent why he had picked
the sailor out of the lineup. The agent responded that the sailor's "face
looked familiar."34 It turned out that on three prior occasions, the
agent had sold the sailor train tickets."
To explain the misidentification by the ticket agent, Glanville
Williams coined the expression "unconscious transference."" The the-
ory posits that the agent's recollection of the sailor as the robber was
an erroneous composite memory." In his memory, the agent had
confused or mixed the recollections of his encounters with the sailor
and the robber. 38
 For some reason, although the agent correctly re-
called the fact of the robbery event, he had a weak memory of the
31 See if notes 141-62 and accompanying text.
32 See MARSHALL Flours, FROM EVIDENCE 'IC) PROOF 18 (1956); PAntict: M. WALL, EYE-W11'
NESS /DENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL. CASES 119-20 (1965); Ross et al., SUPTa note 29, al 80.
33 Seel-101ns, supra note 32, at 119.
34 See id.
35 See id.
341 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OE GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL
115 (311 ed. 1963).
37 See Ross et al., supra note 29, at 93, 96,
See TAYLOR, .s. ttpra note 1, § 2-4,3, at 39; LUCY S. MCGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE
VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 38 (1994),
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robber's appearance. Perhaps during the robbery the agent had selec-
tively" focused his attention on the robber's gun" and neglected to
concentrate' on the robber's face. At the lineup, the agent felt social
pressure to make an identification. After all, why would the police ask
the agent to attend the lineup unless they had good reason to believe
that the lineup included the robber? The sailor and robber were
presumably somewhat similar in appearance, and the agent filled in 42
his memory of the robbery by borrowing the detail of the sailor's
identity." The event of the robbery and his encounters with the sailor
became an undifferentiated whole in the agent's mind." When the
agent attempted to recall the robbery, he visualized the sailor's face.
As Section II will underscore, even the adherents to the theory of
unconscious transference disagree over the fundamental cause of the
phenomenon. 45
 However, most adherents to the theory agree that a
concurrence of certain conditions maximizes the probability that trans-
ference will occur.
To begin with, the witness must have a relatively weak memory of
a detail of the event he or she is attempting to recall." In effect, there
is a gap47
 or hole" in the witness's memory of the event. That gap
makes the witness's memory susceptible to confabulation." Confabu-
lation consists of filling in the gap." There are several possible causes
for the weakness of a memory; at the time of the event, 5 ' the witness
might have had a limited opportunity for observation, or post-event,
the memory might decay" with the passage of times
However, it is important to remember that the unconscious trans-
ference theory does not posit that the witness's recollection of the
59 See ELIZABETH F. L01,111S & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL. AND CRIMINAL
2.12, at 46-47 (1987).
4" See id. § 2.15, 51-52.
41 See id.
42 See Levine & Tapp, supra note 2, at 1093.
43
 See McGouGH, supra note 38, at 38.
44
 See. TAYt.ou, supra note 1, § 2-4.3, at 39.
45 See, e.g., Ross et al., supra note 29, at 86.
46 See id. at 84-85.
47 See McGoUGH, supra note 38. at 34.
48 See. NANCY WALKER PERRY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE CHILD WITNESS: LEGAL.
ISSUES AND DILEMMAS 113 (1991).
411 See Carol B. Cole & Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Memory of Children, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS
MEMORY 178, 190 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds., 1987).
51)
 See McGouGH, supra note 38, at 35-36.
51 See Cole & Loftus, supra note 49, at 206; see also Levine & Tapp, supra note 2, at 1088
("fleeting glimpse").
52 Sze "(ARMEN', supra note I I, at 61.
53
 See Lorrus & DOYLE, supra note 39, § 3.07, at 81; TAYLOR, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 50-51;
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litigated event is generally poor; rather, the hypothesis is that the
witness has a weak memory of a certain detail such as the perpetrator's
identity. Research indicates that during stressful events," a person's
attention focuses" or narrows.56 A person tends to fixate57 on aspects
of the event which are important or salient" to that person, selectively"
concentrating on those central° aspects and neglecting peripheral
details. 6 ' In a life-threatening event such as a robbery, the victim might
focus on the robber's weapon 62 and possible means of escape.° So
engrossed, the victim- witness might pay less attention to the robber's
face."
If the phenomenon of unconscious transference is to occur, there
must not only be a gap in the witness's memory of the event, there
must also be a detail from another event with which to fill the gap. In
the , ticket agent case, the later police investigation revealed that the
agent had encountered the sailor on three prior occasions.° The
agent's memory of the sailor's face was strong enough "to support
subsequent retrieval" when the agent saw the sailor in the lineup.°
According to the unconscious transference theory, if the agent's mem-
ory of the sailor was too weak, the agent would not have recalled the
sailor's appearance when the agent tried to identify the robber. 67
Even a witness's weak memory of the perpetrator's identity and
solid memory of encounters with the sailor do not suffice to trigger
unconscious transference. The theory suggests that the risk of trans-
ference is greatest when a third factor° is present, namely, the witness's
Cole & Loftus, supra note 49, at 191, 196; Levine & Tapp, supra note 2, at 1100-01 (curve of
forgetting).
54 See Cole & Loftus, supra note 49, at 206.
55l
	 id.
5° See Lorrus & DOYLE, Supra note 39, § 2.14, at 50.
57 See id.
58 See Cole & Loftus, supra note 49, at 196; YARMEY, supra note 11, at 79.
59 See YAltst EY, supra note 11, at 58.
tt See Cole & Loftus, supra note 49, at 196; PERRY & WithulTsm Art „supra note 48, at 129.
61 See PERRY & WRICOMMAN, supra note 48, at 108; Cole & Loftus, supra note 49, at 196.
62 See Lorrus & DOYLE, supra note 39, § 2.15, at 51.
63 See. Levine & Tapp, supra note 2, at 1096.
64 See id.; Cole & Loftus, supra note 49, at 200.
65 See Ross et al., supra note 29, at 80.
Si See id. at 84.
"7 See id.
e" See id. It would be an overstatement to describe this factor as a "condition." In at least one
case, transference seemingly occurred when the victim knew the accused well. Rene Lynch &
Dexter Filkins, Green's Ex-Wife Insists He Beat Her; But Dianna D'Aiello Concedes She. Can't Be Sure
He Caused the Death of Her Unborn Baby. She Says She Is In Shock' Over His Vindication, L.A.
'rims, June 26, 1996, at Al; fudge Apologizes, Ends 'I6-Year Nightmare,' Man Wrongly Convicted
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memory of the sailor is neither too weak nor too strong.° The propo-
nents of unconscious transference use various terms to describe the
degree of acquaintance with the innocent person, such as the sailor,
that is the ideal condition for transference: limited, 7° moderate,'' or
passing72 familiarity. 73
 If the witness has had a lengthy exposure to the
innocent person, 74
 the witness probably knows the innocent person too
wel1 75
 for transference to occur. In that event, the witness would usually
remember the original context of his or her encounter with the in-
nocent person, 76
 and there would likely be no misidentification; the
witness would remember the innocent person too well and eliminate
him as the perpetrator. 77
 The witness is unlikely to succumb to uncon-
scious transference when the witness had an extended, direct interac-
tion with the innocent person. 78
 Consider, for example, the patent
unfairness of a lineup which included only the suspect and three
people whom the witness already knew well from weekly church atten-
dance.
The fourth and final factor enhancing the risk of transference is
a similarity between events—the event the witness supposedly confuses
with the legally relevant event the witness is attempting to recal1. 7° A
basic "similarity of occasions"8° is said to be a prerequisite for transfer-
ence' When two incidents are physically similar82 and close in point
of time,83 the similarity can operate as a retrieval cue.84 Likewise, if two
persons resemble each other, 85 the witness might confuse the two. 86
for Bludgeoning Wife, Killing Unborn Child, CHI. TR1B., June 22, 1996, at 17; Brian Williams, NBC
Nightly News: Ex-Marine Released from California Prison After Serving 17 Years for a Crime DNA
Thsting Shows He Didn't Commit (NBC television broadcast, June 21, 1996), available in 1996 WL,
10302127. In the Green case, the victim mistook her husband fir the assailant. Years later, DNA
testing established that he was not the attacker, and a serial killer confessed to the crime.
69 See Ross et al., supra note 29, at 84.
79 See WALL, supra note 32, at 121.
71 See Ross et al., supra note 29, at 85.
72 See id, at 80.
73 See WALL, supra note 32, at 119-20.
7 ' 1 See. Ross et al., supra note 29, at 84, 99.
75 See WALL, supra note 32, at 121.
a See Ross et al., supra note 29, at 85.
77 See id.
78 See id.
741
	 id. at 87, 99; McGouGH, supra note 38, at 37.
8() See'FAyi.oa, supra note 1, § 24.3, at 39.
81 See Ross et al., supra note 29, at 97.
52 See id. at 87.
83 See id. at 93.
84
 See id. at 88.
85 See YARMEY, supra note 11, at 58.
80 See MCGOUGH, supra note 38, at 35.
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One school of psychologists believes that people cluster similar memo-
ries by storing them in groups. 87 If the stimuli are similar," as when two
persons share several physical attributes, 8" an attempt to recall one
person might result in a blending of the two memories."' The two
memories could be so similar and closely connected"' that, at the time
of attempted retrieval, the witness cannot distinguish between them." 2
B. The Related Theories of Clinical Transference
and Source Monitoring Errors
While the previous section explains one sense of "unconscious
transference," the term "transference" also crops up in literature on
psychoanalytic therapy. In this context, the term denotes the process
by which the patient sometimes transfers his or her feelings toward a
third party to the mental health professional." 3 Suppose that the pa-
tient harbored feelings of anger toward a particular individual. The
anger causes behavioral problems which impel the patient to seek
therapy. In the course of therapy, the patient occasionally transfers the
feeling of anger or hostility to the therapist. This sense of "transfer-
ence" differs radically from the theory described in the previous sec-
tion. Although the defense is ordinarily the proponent of evidence of
unconscious transference, the prosecution is more likely to attempt to
introduce evidence about transference in the clinical sense. Thus, if
the accused is charged with an offense against the therapist, the prose-
81 See, e.g., YA RM EY, supra note 11, at 58,65.
88 See id. at 54.
89 See Ross et al., supra note 29, at 88. Australian psychologist Donald Thomson became
interested in the subject of eyewitness testimony in general and unconscious transference in
particular after he had the following unusual experience: as a psychologist, Thomson took part
in a televised discussion of eyewitness memory. ALAN BADDELEY, YOUR MEMORY: A USER'S GUIDE.
131-33 (1982). Later, he was stopped by the police, put in a lineup and idetititied by a very
distraught woman who claimed he had raped her. Id. at 132-33. After the police described the
raise to him, he realized that he had the perfect alibi: the rape occurred while he was taking part
in the televised discussion. Id. at 133. He told the police that his alibi witnesses included an
assistant commissioner of police, who had participated in the discussion. Id. The police were
incredulous; one officer responded, "Yes, and I suppose you've also got Jesus Christ and the
Queen of England toot" /d. Later investigation revealed that the rape occurred while the woman
was watching television; she recognized Thomson's face because it had been on the television
screen during the rape. Id. Thonison's physical characteristics matched almost perfectly the
victim's memory of the rapist's appearance. Six DANIEL L. SCIIACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY:
THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND TIn. PAST 114 (1996).
99 See Ross et al., supra note 29, at 90-91.
91 See id. at 92.
92 See id. at 84,92.
93 See JOHN RRIERE, THERAPY FOR ADULTS Mr ILESTED AS CI IILDREN: BEYOND SURVIVAL 65-66
(1989).
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cution might offer evidence of clinical transference in order to estab-
lish a motive for the crime.
The defense, however, would be more likely to offer evidence
about a third concept, source monitoring errors. Under the uncon-
scious transference theory proper, the defense might concede that the
prosecution witness is correct in testifying that at a particular time and
place, he or she was victimized. However, the defense would argue that
the victim has a weak memory of the perpetrator's identity, that the
victim is passingly familiar with the accused and that the victim is
unconsciously transferring a memory of the accused's identity to the
recollection of the offense. In effect, the victim is inserting a memory
of the accused's face into a recollection of the victimization. Suppose
that the defense admits that the victim had contact with the accused
at the time and place specified in the pleading. The defense contends,
however, that the contact was licit and innocent. The defense argues
that the victim had confused his or her contact with the accused with
an illicit encounter with a third party. In this situation, the defense
sometimes uses the expression, "unconscious transference."" However,
in these situations it would be more accurate to use the terminology
"source monitoring error.'"'' That concept is the broader, umbrella
notion that a person may err in identifying the real source of a part of
a purported memory. The unconscious transference theory relates to
a particular type of source monitoring error, and proponents of the
theory claim that an error is especially likely when the four ideal
conditions for transference occur.
As discussed in Section II, there has been little empirical research
into the narrow theory of unconscious transference. In contrast, there
is a good deal of literature on the umbrella concept of source moni-
toring errors." In particular, it is well documented that a source moni-
toring error can be triggered by external suggestions. 97
 There is a mild,
implicit suggestion whenever the police invite a crime victim or eyewit-
ness to a corporeal or photographic lineup. Again, why would the
police bother to do so unless they believed that the lineup included
the perpetrator?" Any suggestion, explicit or implicit, from an external
source brings social pressure to bear on the witness:" The pressure can
See generally, e.g., United States v. Gober, 43 M.J. 52 (C.A.A.F. 1995).
95
 See generally Marcia K. Johnson et al., Source Monitoring, 114 Psvcatot.. Buti. 3 (July 1993).
96 See id. (collecting published literature).
97
 See Levine & Tapp, supra note 2, at 1087.
98 See Ross et al., supra note 29, at 85, 98.
99
 See Maria S. Zanigoza, Memory„Swestibility, and Eyewitness Testimony in Children and
Adults, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 53, 56, 61 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds., 1987).
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be enormottswg when the external suggestive source is a credible'
authority figure such as a police officer."
IL APPLICATION OF THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE TO THE UNCONSCIOUS TRANSFERENCE THEORY PROPER
There are two situations in which the defense might invoke the
unconscious transference theory. In the first situation, the victim tes-
tifies that at the place and time specified in the accusatory pleading,
the accused attacked him or her. The defense asserts an alibi and
claims that even if the victim was attacked, the accused was not the
attacker; the accused was elsewhere at the time of the assault. The
defense appeals to the unconscious transference theory to explain
away the victim's identification of the accused; the defense contends
that the victim's testimony is a composite memory, blending the gen-
eral recollection of the attack with a memory of the accused's face—a
face the victim is familiar with due to other, innocent contacts. To
support its contention, the defense offers expert testimony about un-
conscious transference. Is the testimony admissible? To be admissible
either at common law or under the Federal Rules, the testimony must
be "relevant" in three respects.
A. "Facial" Logical Relevance Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401
Federal Rule of Evidence 402 states: "Evidence which is not rele-
vant is not admissible."m In turn, Rule 401 defines "relevance" as
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence."'" This species
of relevance is sometimes termed "facial" relevance.' 05 To determine
whether an item of evidence satisfies Rule 401, the judge considers the
terms of the proponent's proffer of evidence—the "fitce" of the prof-
fered evidence—and decides whether the evidence is relevant under
Rule 401. The judge takes the proffer at face value and considers what
the proponent claims the evidence to be; the judge then decides
101) See Levine & Tapp, supra note 2, at 11W.
I q I See. Zaragoza, supra note 99, at 61.
102 See Levine & Tapp, supra note 2, at 1109, 1113.
th3 FED. R. Evil). 4{}2.
Fim, R. Evm. 401.
1°5 See RONALD CARE SON or AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROB-
LEMS Ef Dt AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 203 (3d ed. I 9 9 1 ) .
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whether, given that claim, the item of evidence is relevant to the
material facts. 101 '
Testimony about a possible unconscious transference by the al-
leged victim certainly possesses facial logical relevance. On the one
hand, the testimony is not directly relevant to the historical merits of
the case; the expert is not claiming to have either witnessed the alleged
assault or seen the accused elsewhere at the time of the assault. Nor
does the testimony tend to prove that the victim is committing perjury.
On the other hand, the testimony is pertinent to the quality of the
witness's memory. The witness's credibility is one of the facts of conse-
quence at issue in the case.'° 7 It is well-settled that the opponent may
impeach a witness's credibility by establishing a deficiency in an ele-
ment of his or her competency. 1 °8 0ne of those elements is the witness's
memory.'m Testimony need not be relevant, much less directly relevant,
to the historical merits of a case to satisfy Rule 401 and be presump-
tively admissible. Hence, the trial judge would be obliged to overrule
a facial logical relevance objection to defense expert testimony about
unconscious transference.
B. "Underlying" Logical Relevance Under Frye and Daubert
The facial logical relevance of an item of evidence does not guar-
antee its admissibility. Anglo-American evidence law "is imbued with a
spirit of skepticism.""° The proffered evidence might be facially rele-
vant, but evidence law refuses to accept evidence at face value. The
proponent must not only persuade the judge that the item is relevant
under Rule 401 if the item is what it is claimed to be (facial relevance),
the proponent must also prove that the item of evidence is what the
proponent claims it to be (underlying relevance). [ " The requirement
for proof of underlying logical relevance is a means of ensuring the
reliability of the evidence. 112
In a broad sense, the requirement applies to proffered scientific
testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence 901 codifies the requirement." 3
Subdivision 901 (b) (9) mandates a showing of underlying relevance
when the proponent offers "[eividence describing a process or system
1 °6 See id.
107 See iMWINKELRIED ET	 .stipra note 3, § 304, at 75.
1 " See id. § 710, at 198.
111" See id.
11 ° See CARL-SON ET Al-, supra note 105, at 203.
In See Id.
112 See id. at 203-04.
113 See id. at 204, 207.
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used to produce a result." 11 ' 1 The Advisory Committee Note makes it
clear that the statutory language of the subdivision contemplates scien-
tific processes or systems; as examples of the intended scope of the
subdivision, the Note cites x-rays and computers." 5 The text of the
subdivision requires that the proponent make a "showing that the
process or system produces an accurate result."
Modernly, the courts are divided over the precise content of the
showing necessary to establish the reliability of proffered scientific
evidence. In federal court, the controlling precedent is the Supreme
Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc."'
In that decision, the Court announced that Federal Rule of Evidence
702 governs the question of whether a particular scientific theory or
technique may serve as a basis for expert opinion testimony."' Rule
702 refers to "scientific . . . knowledge." 119 In the majority opinion in
Daubert, Justice Blackmun opted for a methodological definition of
"scientific knowledge." 12" The justice defined science as a methodol-
ogy—the procedure of formulating hypotheses about phenomena and
then engaging in experimentation and observation to falsify or validate
the hypotheses. The extent and quality of the empirical validation of
the hypotheses control the trial judge's decision as to whether the
proffered expert testimony qualifies as admissible scientific knowl-
edge.
Although the showing of the underlying relevance of purportedly
scientific testimony must take the form of proof of empirical validation
in federal court, in the courts of twenty-two states the content of the
requisite showing differs. Those jurisdictions still subscribe to the tra-
ditional Frye test.' 21 The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia decided Frye v. United States in 1923. 122 The Frye court held
that the proponent must demonstrate that the underlying scientific
theory or technique has "gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs." 123 Under Frye, the proponent must establish
114 FED. R. Eyi D. 901(b) (9).
115 FED. R. Evm. 901 advisory committee's note.
L 16 FED. R. Evto. 901(h) (9).
117 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
Ht See generally Edward J. linwinkeiried, The Daubert Decision: Frye Is Dead, Long Live the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 29 'num., Sept. 1993, at 60.
Lit FED. R. EVID. 702.
12° Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
121 See Joseph R. Meaney, From Frye to Daubert: is a Pattern Unfolding?, 35 Jummtmucs J.
191, 193 (1995) (22 stales remain committed to Frye test).
L 22 293 F. 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
125 Id.
120	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 38:107
that as a matter of historical fact, the theory has attained a certain
degree of popularity and acceptance in the pertinent specialty field.m
1. Admissibility in Frye Jurisdictions
The proponent of the unconscious transference theory could be
either the prosecutor or the accused. However, the theory is rarely
utilized by the prosecution. 125 Assume, for instance, that the defense
calls an alibi witness. The witness testifies that at the time of the crime,
she saw the accused far from the crime scene. The prosecutor could
conceivably invoke the unconscious transference theory to attack the
alibi testimony. A government psychologist might opine that the wit-
ness is passingly familiar with the accused and confused the accused
with the person the witness actually saw at the time of the offense.
However, in all the published opinions dealing with transference, the
defense has been the proponent of the evidence of transference. Sup-
pose that a prosecutor objects to the admission of testimony about the
unconscious transference theory on the ground that the theory does
not qualify tinder Frye. It is arguable that the trial judge should over-
rule the objection.
The defense attorney would initially argue that the theory satisfies
Frye because the theory enjoys the necessary degree of popularity in
psychological circles. Admittedly, in a recent unconscious transference
case, the Kentucky Supreme Court remarked that "the defense did not
establish that . . . transference was a condition generally recognized in
the medical or scientific community." Although the defense did not
124
	 1 l'Aut. C. CIANNELLI & EDWARD J. INDVINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5(B)(2),
at 15-16 (2d ed. 1993).
125 See State v. Banes, No. 94-CF-185 (Winnebago County, Wis. Mar. 31, 1995) (unpublished
opinion) (interview with prosecuting attorney by Imwinkelried providing all information not
provided by Loftus). In Banes, Professor Loftus testified on behalf of the prosecution. Id. Accord-
ing to Loftus, in that case, the accused was charged with murdering his wife. Id. She drove a car
with the vanity license plate 14132ME" (Happy Birthday to Me). See id. When the wife was
discovered missing, the tnedia broadcast her license plate. See id. Several defense witnesses
testified that they saw a woman driving a car with that license plate on dates after the accused
had allegedly murdered his wife. See id. Dr. Loftus explained to the jury that having been exposed
to the media broadcast of the license number, the witnesses could have unconsciously confused
that number with the license of the vehicles they had seen. Id. In a Colorado trial, the prosecution
had occasion to proffer expert psychological testimony that It was quite plausible that a victim
of a violent crime that got a good look at one attacker's face, but not the second attacker's face,
would later he able to make a clear identification of the first attacker, but would interchange his
role with that of the second attacker." See Lorrus & Darts:, supra note 39, § 4.10, at 100-01; see
also State v. Davis, 666 N.E.2d 1099, 1106-07 (Ohio 1996); iMWINKETRIED Fr AL., supra note 3,
§ 2816, at 945 n.104.
126 Mack v. Commonwealth, 860 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Ky. 1993).
December 19961	 UNCONSCIOUS TRANSFERENCE	 121
make the required showing in that case, there are indications that the
showing can be made. In one survey of psychological experts, 84.5%
responded that testimony about the transference phenomenon is suffi-
ciently reliable to be admissible in court. 127 To qualify under Frye, a
theory need not have attained universal or unanimous support in the
specialty field. 128 It suffices if a clear majority of the members of the
pertinent specialty subscribe to the theory. 12"
Alternatively, the defense attorney can argue that this species of
expert testimony is exempt from the requirement of a showing of
general acceptance. Over the years, the California Supreme Court has
been one of the most vocal proponents of the Frye standard.'"" Even
after the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Daubert, the California Supreme Court affirmed its adherence to
Frye.' 31 Yet the same court had carved out a large exception from the
scope of the Frye rule for "soft" scientific evidence—testimony which
does not rely on instrumental analysis and "hard," quantitative inter-
pretive standards.' 32 In doing so, the court reasoned that the rationale
for the Frye rule is inapplicable to "soft" scientific evidence. The court
asserted that the rationale applies only to purportedly scientific testi-
mony "produced by a machine"—the proverbial Black Box.' 33 In a case
involving psychological testimony about the unreliability of eyewitness
testimony, the court noted that psychologists employ "no such [instru-
mental] methods."' 34 In the court's judgment, it is safe to exempt such
testimony from Frye because there is less risk that the jurors will "as-
cribe an inordinately high degree of certainty to" the testimony. 135
Many courts have followed California's lead in exempting psychologi-
cal testimony from the Frye rule.' 36 The author of the most comprehen-
sive study of this issue has proclaimed that the exemption is "[t]he
majority view" in Frye states.' 37 Testimony about unconscious transfer-
ence would probably fall within the ambit of the exemption.
127 See Ross et al., supra note 29, at 97 ("in a recent survey 	 . approximately 84.5 percent
of a sample of experts in the psycholegal field indicated that there was sufficient. evidence to
testily in court as to the reliability of the unconscious transference phenomenon").
128 See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 124, § 1-5(B) (2), at 15,
129 See id. § I-5(B) (2), at 16.
150 See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Cal. 1976).
131 Nu, plc v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 327 (Cal. 1994).
I 52 People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 723-24 (Cal. 1984).
133 Id
154 Id. at 724.
135 Id.
136 See 2 GREGORY P. JOSEPII & STEPI IEN A. SALTZ BURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: Tim FEDERAL
RULES IN Tim STATES § 51.5, at 21 (1988).
137 See Roger S. Hanson,fames Alphonzo Frye. Is Sixty Five Years Old; Should He Retire?, 16 W.
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2. Admissibility in Dauber/ jurisdictions
Although testimony about transference would likely be admissible
over a Frye objection, its admissibility in a jurisdiction following Dauber'
is much more problematic.
Under Daubert, there does not appear to be any exemption for
"soft" science. In Daubert, justice Blackmun adopted a broad definition
of science—one expansive enough to include "soft" as well as "hard"
science. 138
 For instance, the lower courts have tended to extend the
new validation standard to proposed testimony about syndromes.'" As
discussed previously, the California Supreme Court chose to exempt
psychological testimony about eyewitness identification from Frye scru-
tiny. In contrast, the lower federal courts have ruled that psychological
testimony must be subjected to Dauber' scrutiny. 140
Can the unconscious transference theory withstand Daubert scru-
tiny? Research, including a notable study by Dr. Loftus, 14 ' has definitely
established that suggestion can distort a witness's memory: 42 Sugges-
tion can both supplement and transform a memory: 43
 However, the
transference theory is quite another matter. Is there adequate empiri-
cal validation of that theory? There are some studies tending to verify
the theory of unconscious transference. One is a study by Read: 44 That
laboratory study compared a group of "transference" subjects with a
Sr. U. L. REv. 357, 411 (1989): see also Edward" lmwinkelried, Attempts to Limit the Scope of the
Frye Standard for the Admission of Scientific Evidence: Confronting the Real Cost of the General
Acceptance Test, 10 iiEflAV. Sc[. & L. 441, 447-48 (1992).
1514 See Edward J. Iinwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-Reaching Implica-
tions of the Dauber' Court's Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific Enterprise, 81 1(.1wA L.
REv. 55, 69-71 (1995).
139 See Krista L. Duncan, Note, "Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics"? Psychological Syndrome
Evidence in the Courtroom After Dattbert, 71 IND. L.J. 753, 762 (1996); Jennifer Sparks, Comment,
Admissibility of Expert Psychological Evidence in the Federal Courts, 27 ARIZ, Sr. L.J. 1315, 1326
(1995).
1411
	 e.g., United States v. Amador-Galvan, 9 F.3d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Gier
v. Educational Serv. Unit No. 16, 66 F.3d 940, 943-44 (8th Cir. 1995).
141 See TAYLOR, supra note I, § 3-2, at 48. In the study, two groups of subjects viewed the same
film of an automobile accident. Id. Later, the members of both groups responded to a question-
naire about the accident. Id. One group received a questionnaire using the term "smashed." Id.
The other group completed a questionnaire using the term "hit." Id. Still later, the members of
both groups were questioned again about the accident. Id. On this Occasion, they were asked
whether they had observed broken glass at the accident scene. Id. "There was no broken glass
apparent anywhere in the film. Nevertheless, over twice as many subjects who had earlier been
asked the 'smashed' question answered in the affirmative than did the 'hit' subjects." Id.
142 See id. ("established beyond any doubt").
143 See LOFTUS & DOYLE, „WPM note 39, § 3.05, at 76.
144j.D. Read et al., The Unconscious 'Transference Effect: Are Innocent Bystanders Ever Misiden-
tified?, 4 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 3 (1990); Ross et al., supra note 29, at 82.
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group of "control" subjects.'" All subjects were asked to identify an
assailant from a photographic lineup.'" The lineup included an inno-
cent person whose appearance was similar to that of the assailant. ' 47
The "transference" subjects had previously been exposed to the inno-
cent person while the "control" subjects had not.'" At the photo-
graphic lineup, "[t]wenty-five percent of the transference subjects misi-
dentified the [innocent person], as compared with only 1 2 percent of
the control subjects."'"
Notwithstanding the impressive results in the Read study, it has
been difficult to produce the unconscious transference phenomenon
in empirical studies, either laboratory or field. Quantitatively, there
have been few studies of transference.' 5" In the words of one commen-
tator, there is "only a handful" of empirical investigations into the
phenornenon.''' Moreover, there are qualitative concerns about the
methodology of sonic studies; for instance, some lacked a control
group.' 52 Further, while a number of studies, such as Read's, point to
the validity of the theory, other studies reach a contrary conclusion;
"the findings are mixed, providing [only] weak and inconsistent sup-
port for the existence of unconscious transference."'" The extant re-
search has not resolved the fundamental question of the cause of
transference.'" Finally, most of the investigations to date have been
laboratory studies.' 59 Those studies may lack ecological validity.'" Labo-
ratory experiments "do not capture the level of stress or personal
involvement experienced by witnesses to real crimes." 157 We must be
cautious in extrapolating from laboratory experiments although the
transference phenomenon has seemingly occurred in some notable
real world incidents.'" A sober, but intellectually honest, assessment
145 See Ross et id., supra note 29, at 82.
146 se, id.
' 47 See id.
148 see id.
1 '1" See id.
15'1 See Ross et al., supra note 29, at 81-82, 97. 99.
151 1t/. at. 81.
152 see id.
'" See id.; see also id. at 85 ("mixed support").
154 See id. at 85-86.
1 f16 See Ross et al., supra note 29, at 85, 98.
156 See id. at 85.
'•See id. at 98-99.
156 Transference fairly clearly occurred in the Thomson case. See supra note 89. 1 t also scents
to have occurred in the Green case. See .supra note 68. Transference may have occurred in some
of the cases documented in the study done by the National Institute of Justice. See. NATIONAL
OF JUSTICE, MOM note 6.
(study conducted by Dr. Buckhout).
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would be that there is a great deal more to learn about the phenome-
non, especially the factors which maximize the probability of its occur-
rence.' 59
 We are still far from reaching any definitive conclusions as to
the merit of the transference theory. 1 ° Although the psychological
community has launched its study of the theory, at present, we have
only the beginning of the empirical research needed to ultimately
validate the theory.' 61
 Thus, based on the current state of the scientific
record, transference testimony would be more readily challengeable in
a Daubert jurisdiction than in a Frye court. 162
C. "Legal" Relevance Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403
Even a demonstration of both facial and underlying logical rele-
vance does not impel the trial judge to admit an item of evidence. The
opponent can still object on the ground that the item is not "legally"
relevant. The term "legal" relevance has been much criticized: 163
 the
usage, however, persists." The term is used as a shorthand expression
to describe the trial judge's discretionary power to exclude logically
relevant evidence when she believes that the incidental probative dan-
gers such as prejudice and time consumption outweigh the probative
value of the evidence.' 65
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 embodies a version of the "legal"
irrelevance doctrine. The rule reads: "Although [logically] relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."' 6" Rule 403 "cut[s]
across the entire body of the Rules,"' 67
 applying to virtually all types of
159
 See. Ross et al., supra note 29, at 99.
110 See id.
Hu See id.
162 Based on her work as a memory scientist and her experience as a trial witness in courts
following Daubert, Loftus believes that the theory has sufficient empirical support to be admitted
over objection. Rased on their reading of the published appellate opinions, Gilligan and lin-
winkelried believe that the objection is likely to be sustained. In part, the disagreement among
the authors reflects the fact that the courts, both trial and appellate, are still struggling to plumb
the meaning of Daubert. See generally G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its
Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 GkEtturroN L. Rev. 939 (1996).
"See CARISON ET Al.., supra note 105, at 312.
161 See id.
Hk" See id. at 311- 12.
k6 Fen. R. Evin. 403.
167
 Paul F. Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 21,
29 (1974).
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evidence. 1  Scientific evidence is no exception.' 69 Indeed, the Daubert
Court indicated that Rule 403 is especially applicable to scientific
testimony.'" The Court approvingly quoted District Court Judge Jack
Weinstein's assertion that the trial judge is entitled to "exerciser' more
control over experts than over lay witnesses" because expert evidence
can be "both powerful and quite misleading. "171
Of course, Rule 403 does not allow the trial judge to indiscrimi-
nately exclude probative evidence. On its face, Rule 403 does not even
state that the proponent of an item of evidence has the burden of
persuading the judge that the probative value of the evidence outstrips
any attendant probative risks. The rule is biased in favor of the admis-
sion of logically relevant evidence.' 72 The chair of the drafting commit-
tee, Albert Jenner, testified in Congress that "the overall philosophy
and thrust" of the rule is to "place [the burden] upon he who seeks
the exclusion of relevant evidence."'" Once the proponent of an item
of evidence demonstrates its logical relevance, Rule 403 assigns the
opponent the burden of convincing the trial judge that the incidental
probative dangers substantially outweigh the probative worth of the
evidence. 174
Despite its bias in favor of admissibility, Rule 403 is often invoked
to exclude logically relevant evidence. Courts are most inclined to do
so when the probative value of the evidence in question is marginal"'
or weak.'" In gauging the probative value of an item of evidence, the
trial judge considers numerous factors, including the facial definite-
ness of the testimony.'" That factor has often played a role in judicial
decisions to exclude expert testimony. In particular, there are nurner-
i" But see FED. R. Eviu. I509(a) (2). Convictions falling within that narrow provision are
exempt from balancing under Rule 403. SeelmwiNKELRIED ET AL., supra note 3, § 708, at 193-95.
11') See
	 Imwitoura,awn, supra note 124, § 1—(1(11), at 28.
17"Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
171 jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; it Should Not Be
Amended, Address Before the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference (July 10, 1991), in 138 F.R.D.
631, 632.
172 See. EDWARD J, IMIXINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 8:28, ch. 8, at 57-58
(1984).
175
	 of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform. of Federal Criminal Laws
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 87 (1973) (statement of Albert E. Jenner, Jr.).
174 See. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 172, § 8:28, ch. 8, at 57-58.
175 See id. § 8:27.
17" See id.
177 See. Edward J. linwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule
of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 879, 884-85 (1988).
126	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol 38:107
ous cases invoking Rule 403 "to exclude [expert] opinions which fall
short of expressing a probability or certainty." 178
If those cases are a benchmark, testimony about unconscious
transference is vulnerable to a Rule 403 objection. Assume that a case
includes all the factors maximizing the probability of unconscious
transference: a weak memory of the detail of the litigated event, a
memory of a similar detail from another event and a merely passing
familiarity with the detail in the second event. Even on that favorable
set of assumptions, the most that the expert can truthfully say is that
an unconscious transference "may have taken place." In many cases,
an investigator can verify whether there was a suggestive influence on
a witness. 180
 The witness might recall being asked a question phrased
in a particular fashion, or a third party might have overheard a state-
ment made to the witness. In contrast, by its very nature, unconscious
transference defies that type of verification. 181
 At most, the expert can
offer the jury educated speculation. 182 None of the available transfer-
ence studies would permit the expert to testify that transference "cer-
tainly" or even "probably" occurred. An honest expert would have to
couch his or her opinions to include such terms as "could," "might,"
or "possibly." The trial judge might well decide that the opinion pos-
sesses such minimal probative value that it does not warrant the time
needed to call the expert and allow the expert to educate the jury on
as debatable a theory as transference. In short, even if the proponent
of transference testimony defeats a Frye or Daubert objection, a Rule
403 objection might be sustained.
The operative verb in the above statement, though, is "might."
Rule 403 would not invariably bar the admission of testimony about
unconscious transference. The rule does not grant either trial or ap-
pellate courts authority to formulate general exclusionary rules of
evidence; rather, the rule confers on the trial bench a limited dis-
cretion to balance in an ad hoc, case-specific manner. 183
 To gain an
acquittal, an accused need merely raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt.
178 Edward J. finwinkelried & Robert G. Scofield, The Recognition of an Accused's Constitu-
tional Right to Introduce Expert Testimony Attacking the Weight of Prosecution Scientific Evidence:
The Antidote for the Supreme Court's Mistaken Assumption in California v. Trombetta, 33 ARiz. L.
REv. 59, 59, 69 (1991).
179
 See WALL., supra note 32, at 120-21.
18° See id. at 120.
181
 See id.
182 See id.
1811 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary
Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 577, 615 (1984).
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Many judges equate proof beyond a reasonable doubt with a very high
probability of guilt, a probability of 85% or higher.'" In a given case,
the pivotal issue might be the reliability of an eyewitness identification.
If all four conditions for transference were present, a judge might find
that the probative worth of testimony about transference could suffice
to generate a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind.
As previously stated, under Rule 403 the judge balances the pro-
bative worth of the proffered evidence against any incidental probative
dangers, such as the risk that the jury will overvalue the evidence.
Numerous courts have asserted that lay jurors are inclined to overesti-
mate the probative value of expert testimony. L 55 However, the findings
in the empirical studies conducted to date are at odds with that asser-
tion. 18° After canvassing the studies, two leading commentators con-
cluded that "the image of a spellbound jury mesmerized by . . . a[n]
expert is more likely to reflect ... [judicial] fantasies than the .. .
realities of courtroom testimony."' 87 If so, there is little potential preju-
dice to countervail against the probative worth of the transference
testimony. Consequently, the judge could easily strike the Rule 403
balance in favor of admitting the testimony. Assuming the judge ap-
plied the Frye test, the testimony might surmount all the evidentiary
barriers to admission.
Ill. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF APPLYING RAPE SHIELD LAWS TO
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF UNCONSCIOUS TRANSFERENCE IN THE
SENSE OF A SOURCE MONITORING ERROR
The outset of Section II of this article noted that there are two
situations in which the defense might attempt to invoke the transfer-
ence theory. Section H addressed the first situation in which the ac-
cused invokes the transference theory proper and relies on an alibi
defense. In that situation, the defense transference theory is that the
victim became acquainted with the accused on other, innocent occa-
sions. The defense argues that while the victim's general memory of a
sexual assault at a particular time and place is accurate, the victim has
"14 See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Stipp. 388, 410 (E.D.N,Y 1978) (survey of district judges
conducted by Judge jack Weinstein).
l " See Edward J. Iinwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from
the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28	 L. Riw. 554, 562-64 (1983) (collecting cases).
158 See id. at 566-70.
187 Richard Rogers & Charles P. Ewing, Ultimate Opinion Proscriptions: A Cosmetic Fix and a
Plea for Empiricism, 13 LAw & Hum. BEtinv. 357, 363 (1989).
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mistakenly integrated into that memory a recollection of the detail of
the accused's face.' 88
 In that situation, the admissibility of transference
evidence turns on the logical and legal relevance standards governing
expert testimony. As Section II explained, in some circumstances, that
evidence would be admissible.
In the second situation, the thrust of the defense differs. In this
situation, the accused admits that he or she had contact with the
complainant at the specified time and place, but the accused denies
committing the alleged actus reus. Again, the defense might appeal to
a transference theory. However, in this situation, the defense theory is
that on other occasions, the victim had sexual contacts with a third
party or parties. The defense argues that while the victim's memory of
an encounter with the accused at a particular time and place is accu-
rate, the victim has mistakenly incorporated into that memory a recol-
lection of the nature of the sexual contacts with the third party.'sg As
previously stated, on these facts it would be more appropriate to refer
to a "source monitoring error."'" In this fact pattern, to lay the foun-
dation for the expert testimony about a source monitoring error, the
defense might attempt to introduce evidence of the complainant's
sexual encounters with third parties. 19 '
As in the first situation, to justify introducing the expert testimony,
the defense must comply with the logical and legal relevance standards
set out in Section II. However, here the defense faces an additional
hurdle: the exclusionary rules such as rape shield laws, which protect
the privacy of crime victims. In the second situation, the defense
attorney might invite the expert to explicitly refer to the complainant's
sexual encounters with third parties as part of the foundation for the
expert testimony. Those encounters supply the detail, the nature of the
sexual contact, that the accused claims the complainant is uncon-
sciously transferring to his or her memory of the innocent encounter
with the accused. The rub is that in most jurisdictions, the rape shield
168 See Lorrus & DoYLE, supra note 39, § 3.05, at 76.
189 See TAYLOR, supra note I, § 3-2, at 48.
' 90 See Johnson et al., supra note 95, at 3.
191
 Expert testimony is often presented in syllogistic fashion. See generally Edward J. Imwinkel-
tied, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Thstimony, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1988); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Educational Significance of the Syllogistic Structure
of Expert Testimony, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1148 (1993). The transference theory in effect functions
as the expert's mayor premise. The case-specific information about the complainant's sexual
contact with third parties would serve as the minor premise. The expert's conclusion would be
the final opinion that, as a result of transference, the complainant has confused his or her contact
with the accused and their encounters with the third parties.
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law would preclude the defense from proving those sexual contacts
with third parties.'" 2
A. The Rape Shield Statutes
At one time, in sex offense prosecutions, American courts rou-
tinely admitted evidence of the complainant's other sexual conduct.'"
The courts permitted the defense to use the evidence as circumstantial
proof of the complainant's consent to the sexual conduct alleged in
the accusatory pleading. 194 The defense argued that the conduct evi-
denced the complainant's promiscuous disposition and that, in turn,
that disposition increased the probability that the complainant had
voluntarily consented to the sexual encounter with the accused. Evi-
dence of the complainant's sexual history was liberally admissible to
prove consent.'`''
The norm of liberal admissibility faced sharp criticism.'"" The
criticism had two prongs. One prong rested on the legal relevance
doctrine: evidence of the complainant's prior sexual history has mini-
mal probative value on the question of whether, on a specific occasion,
he or she consented to sexual contact.'`"? A person's willingness to
engage in sexual contact with A may give us little or no insight into
192 The defense might argue that the rape shield law applies only when the defense offers
substantive evidence (Intl the alleged victim has engaged in other sexual conduct. The defense
could contend that the law is inapplicable when the defense offers the evidence on another theory
for the limited purpose of establishing the basis for an expert's opinion. Concededly, the text of
the statute lends some plausibility to this contention. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence
412(a) (1) bars ")eividence offered to prove any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior."
Id. (emphasis added). That construction of the statute, however, would be illiberal; it would
Frustrate the policy inspiring the statute. As we shall see in the following subsection, the statute
is intended to prevent unwarranted "public intrusion" into the victim's privacy, See 124 Cost:.
Rm. H34,912 (1978). A public intrusion would occur whether the defense explicitly mentioned
the victim's sexual history to prove certain conduct on the victim's part or to lay the foundation
for an opinion about a source monitoring error, Although the defense counsel might attempt to
characterize the latter use of the evidence as a "limited" purpose, the nature of the use would
not limit the intrusion into the victim's privacy.
193 See Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Modern Status of Admissibility, in Forcible Rape
Prosecution, of Complainant's Prior Sexual Acts, 95 A.L.R.3d 1181, 1185 (1979); Kristine Cordier
Karnezis, Annotation, Modern Status of Admissibility, in Forcible Rape Prosecution, 'f Complainant's
General Reputation for Unchastity, 94 A.L.R.3d 257, 262 (1979).
194 See CARL SON ET Al.., _supra note 105, at 465-66.
1 • See id.
196
 See generally Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Dibulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,
77 CoLum. L REV. 11 (1977); Barbara Caulfield, The New Oregon Sexual Offenses Evidence Law:
An Evaluation, 55 OR. L. Rev. 493 (1976); Leon Letwin, "Unchaste Character," Ideology, and the
California Rape Evidence Law, 54 S. Cm.. L. REV. 35 (1980).
t57 See, e.g., Doe v. United Stales, 666 F.2d 43, 47 (4th Cir. 1981).
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the question of whether they would be willing to engage in similar
conduct with B. 1 "8
The second prong was based on extrinsic social policy: the liberal
admissibility of a complainant's sexual history frustrates the public
interest in the enforcement of penal statutes criminalizing sexual mis-
conduct. Sexual conduct tends to be private, and there will rarely be
a third party witness to the complainant's sexual encounters. Hence,
if the penal statutes are to be vigorously enforced, victims must feel
free to report the offenses. However, given the liberal admissibility of
evidence of sexual history, the victim could anticipate "embarrass-
ment" and "public intrusion into her privacy."19° The victim might fear
that at the public trial of her complaint, her sexual history will be
paraded before the world." That fear could serve as a significant
disincentive to reporting a rape offense. According to this line of
argument, excluding the evidence of the complainant's sexual history
would not only shield the victim's privacy rights, the exclusion would
also vindicate the public interest in enforcing criminal statutes such as
rape prohibitions. That interest is a weighty one. Sexual crimes, notably
rape, are serious offenses against the person. Moreover, "[i]1' one
regards rape as a society-defining crime, part of a system of oppression
that promotes male supremacy," 2° 1
 there is a vital social interest in
ensuring the effective enforcement of these criminal proscriptions.
These criticisms have led the vast majority of jurisdictions to adopt
rape shield 1aws.202
 Federal Rule of Evidence 412 is illustrative. By its
terms, Rule 412 applies "in any . . criminal proceeding involving
alleged sexual misconduct."" When the rule applies, it generally op-
crates to bar "[e]vidence offered to prove that any alleged victim
engaged in other sexual behavior." 204
 This statutory language is broad
enough to include evidence of the complainant's other sexual encoun-
ters, at least when explicitly mentioned as part of the foundation for
expert testimony about unconscious transference. The domino effect
is that if the rape shield law bars that evidence, the expert opinion
itself could be rendered inadmissible because it would lack the 'feces-
198 The courts became especially skeptical of the probative value of the evidence when there
was a substantial time lapse between the two sexual encounters. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 716 S.W.2d
799, 800-01 (Mo. 1986) (incidents were not "reasonably contemporaneous").
° 124 CONG. REC. 1134,912 (1978).
200 See, e.g., Harris v. State, 362 S.E.2d 211, 213 (Ca. 1987).
20 ' David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN.
L. REv. 529, 583 (1994).
2t2 See Doe, 666 F.2d at 48 n.9 (45 states have adopted such laws).
an
	 R. Evw. 4I2(a).
2G4 EEO. R. EVID. 4 I 2 (a)(1).
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sary foundation."'" In short, even if the expert testimony could run the
gauntlet of Frye or Daubert, the rape shield law might preclude its
admission. 206
B. The Constitutional Theory for Overriding Statutory
Exclusionary Rules of Evidence
Although Rule 412 purports to generally exclude evidence of the
complainant's sexual history, the statute is subject to several excep-
tions."' However, only one express exception is applicable here. The
exception comes into play—and the bar of the statute is lifted—when
255 The defense attorney might attempt to "finesse" this problem by refraining from asking
the expert witness to refer explicitly to the victim's other sexual conduct. The problem is that
while this tactic would reduce the strain the evidence placed on the rape shield laws, the tactic
would make the evidence even more vulnerable to a Rule 403 objection. Without a full explana-
tion of the underlying reasoning, the evidence would have less facial probative value. Moreover,
the vagueness of the description of the opinion's basis might prompt the jurors to engage in
speculation about the basis. It should be remembered, however, that under Rule 403, the trial
judge does not announce categorical exclusionary rules. Rather, the judge engages in ad hoc,
case-specific balancing.
206 See 124 CONG, REG. 1-134,912 (1978).
2" Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b) (1) (1.1) carves out an exception for "evidence of specific
instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual
misconduct." This exception applies only to evidence of the alleged victim's other sexual contact
with the accused. That exception is inapplicable here; our hypothesis is that the accused is
attempting to introduce evidence of the alleged victim's sexual contact with a third party or
parties. Rule 412(1)1(1) (A) recognizes another exception for "evidence of specific instances of
sexual behavior by the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was
the source of semen, injury or other physical evidence." This statutory language was intended to
apply only in "clearly and narrowly defined circumstances." 124 CONG. REC. 1-134,913 (1978). This
exception has been dubbed the "Scottsboro rebuttal provision." See 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& Kio.NNETII W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5388, at 590-91
(1980). The provision "takes its name from the Depression era cause celebre in which a group
of black men were charged with raping two white women on a freight train." Id. In that case, the
prosecution offered medical testimony that semen had been found in the women's vaginas, but
the trial judge excluded defense rebuttal evidence that the women had engaged in intercourse
with other men the night before, See. McLean v. United States, 377 Pad 74, 78 n.6 (D.C. 1977).
This exception is also inapplicable. The exception comes into play when the prosecution offers
expert testimony to corroborate the alleged victim's testimony. Thus, after the alleged victim
testifies that there was intercourse, the prosecution might offer evidence of semen found in
vaginal swabs to corroborate the testimony. Rule 412(b) (1)(A) would entitle the accused to
introduce evidence of the alleged victim's intercourse with a third party to explain away the
seemingly corroborative testimony; if the victim had intercourse with her boyfriend in approxi-
mately the same time frame as the alleged rape, that intercourse would furnish an innocent
explanation for the finding of semen. The same analysis would apply if the prosecution offered
either an emergency room physician's testimony about the victim's injuries to corroborate her
testimony that intercourse was forcible or a DNA expert's testimony to corroborate the victim's
identification of the accused as the rapist. In the fact situations discussed in this article, however,
the accused is not offering evidence of the alleged victim's sexual contact with third parties to
rebut any corroborative testimony introduced by the prosecution.
132	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 38:107
the exclusion of the evidence "would violate the constitutional rights
of the defendant."2"8
 The exception is a concession to a United States
Supreme Court line of authority dating back to 1967.
In that year, the Supreme Court decided the seminal case of
Washington u Texas. 2°9
 There the Court passed on the constitutionality
of two Texas statutes providing that an accused could not call as a
defense witness any person who had been charged or previously con-
victed as a principal, accomplice, or accessory in the same crime:216
These statutes had the effect of rendering such persons altogether
incompetent as defense witnesses. 211 In Washington, the accused was
charged with murder. 212
 At trial, the accused attempted to call Charles
Fuller as a defense witness.213
 The defense offer of proof indicated that
Fuller would have testified that he, Fuller, was the shooter and that the
accused had attempted to prevent him from shooting. 21 `' The difficulty
was that Fuller had already been convicted of the murder:215 Conse-
quently, under the Texas statutes, Fuller was incompetent as a defense
witness:216
 The trial judge applied the statutes, and the state appellate
courts upheld the constitutionality of the statutes. 217
Washington's conviction reached the Supreme Court while Earl
Warren was Chief Justice."' Chief Justice Warren himself authored the
opinion. 219
 First, the Chief Justice held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause incorporates the Sixth Amendment compul-
sory process guaranLee. 22° Consequently, the guarantee is directly en-
forceable at state trial.221
Second, Chief Justice Warren concluded that the state statutes in
question violated the guarantee. 222
 Texas had argued that it had not
denied Washington compulsory process; in fact, it had given him a
subpoena for Fuller. 223
 Texas contended that it "merely" prevented him
2°8 FE.0. R. Evil). 412(b) (1)(C).
20' See generally 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
218 Id. at 15.
211
	 id. at 16.
212 1d. at 15.
213 See id. at 16-17.
214
 See Washington, 388 U.S. at 16.
215 See id,
218 See id.
217 See id.
218 See id. at 14.
219 Washington, 388 U.S. at 14.
220 /d. 01 18-19.
221 See id.
222 1d. at 23.
223 See id.
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from calling Fuller as a trial witness.'" Chief justice Warren responded
that the "Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the
futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance
of witnesses whose testimony he has no right to use." 225 The Chief
justice specifically stated that as a necessary corollary, the express
compulsory guarantee implies the accused's "right to present his own
witnesses to establish a defense."226
 At the very least, the accused has a
"right to put on the stand a witness who [is] physically and mentally
capable of testifying to events that he [has] personally observed, and
whose testimony . [is] relevant and material to the defense." 227
Washington was a landmark case. Its potential implications were
breathtaking. Once the Court posited the existence of a constitutional
right to present exculpatory evidence, conceivably the defense could
attack any common-law or statutory exclusionary rule of evidence
which seemed to foreclose the introduction of relevant defense evi-
dence. However, the lower courts tended to read Washington nar-
rowly. 2" In Washington, the Supreme Court was confronted with a
sweeping incompetency rule which kept a potential defense witness off
the stand. The issue was whether this new implied constitutional right
was limited to broad incompetency rules. 229
 Did the right spend its
force by invalidating such rules? After the defense witness took the
stand, could the state still apply any exclusionary rules it wanted to
regulate the content of the witness's testimony? Most lower courts
answered that question in the affirmative. For example, in an Illinois
case, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared that "there is no sugges-
tion in Washington that the admission of otherwise inadmissible hear-
say is constitutionally required."2"
In 1973, though, the Supreme Court proved the lower courts
wrong. In that year the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Cham-
bers v. Mississippi. 231 Like Washington, Chambers was a homicide prose-
cution."' Chambers was accused of shooting a police officer.'" His
defense was that another person, Gable McDonald, was the real kiI-
ler.234
 McDonald had not only given a sworn statement to that el-
224 See Washington, 388 U,S. at 23.
225 Id.
216 Id. at 19.
227 Id. at 23.
229 Spe, e.g., People v. Scott, 288 N.E.2d 478, 482 (III. 1972).
229 See 1M WIN KELRIED , supra note 28, § I--2.a, at 6.
23t'Scoi1, 288 N.E.2d at 482.
231 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973),
232
 id. 11 l 285.
233
 See id.
2M
 See id, at 289.
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feet, on three occasions, he had also told acquaintances that he was
the killer.235 At trial, the defense called McDonald as a witness:236 On
direct examination by the defense attorney, McDonald conceded that
he had made the sworn statement. 237 During cross examination by the
prosecution, McDonald repudiated that statement."" Later the defense
attorney attempted to elicit McDonald's statements from three of
McDonald's friends. 239
When the defense attempted to do so, the prosecutor initially
objected on hearsay grounds. 2" The defense attorney responded that
although McDonald's out-of-court statements were hearsay, they fell
within the exception for declarations against interest."' At that point,
the prosecutor noted that Mississippi hearsay law followed the early,
common-law view restricting the scope of that exception to declara-
tions against proprietary or pecuniary interest. 242 The statements in
question were contrary to penal interest."' On that basis, the trial judge
excluded the hearsay statements, and the state appellate courts affir-
med. 244
Like Washington's conviction, Chambers's conviction reached the
Supreme Court."' On this occasion, Justice Powell penned the lead
opinion.246 The Justice was impressed that the excluded hearsay state-
ments carried "considerable assurance of ... reliability.' 247 He listed
several indicia of reliability: McDonald made the statements shortly
after the killing; he made the statements spontaneously to close ac-
quaintances; there was corroboration of his guilt, because he had
previously owned a gun of the caliber used in the shooting; he had
made three separate admissions to friends; and "in a very real sense,"
the statements were disserving to his penal interest."' Justice Powell
conceded that the hearsay rule sometimes serves the legitimate pur-
pose of blocking the admission of unreliable evidence, 2" but on the
235 See id.
238 See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 291.
"7 See id.
238 See id.
239
 See ed. at 292.
24' See id.
241 See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299.
242 See id.
21 :' See id.
244 See id. at 293.
245 See id. at 284.
246 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 285.
247 Id. at 300.
248 Id. at 300-01.
248 /d. at 298.
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facts of the case sub judice the hearsay was demonstrably reliable.
Citing Washington, justice Powell wrote that the trial judge had applied
the hearsay rule in a mechanistic, unconstitutional manner. 25°
Chambers thus expanded the scope of the implied constitutional
right to present exculpatory evidence. Justice Powell made it clear that
the right is not confined to broad incompetency rules; its reach also
extends to exclusionary rules governing the content of defense wit-
nesses' testimony. Although the hearsay doctrine in question in Cham-
bers is an exclusionary rule inspired by doubts about the trustworthi-
ness of a certain type of evidence, the lower courts have extended the
Washington-Chambers line of authority to rules resting on extrinsic
social policy. In many cases, the courts have invoked the implied con-
stitutional right to override privilege claims. 25 ' When the defense has
made a foundational showing that the evidence in question is both
necessary and demonstrably reliable, the courts have invalidated the
application of such privileges involving marriage counselors, 252 physi-
cians,253
 psychotherapists, 254 spouses, 255 and even attorneys. 256 The
courts have weighed the public policy underlying the privilege against
the accused's constitutional right and struck the balance in the ac-
cused's favor.
Notwithstanding those decisions, the Supreme Court's most re-
cent pronouncement on the subject may signal that the Court's sup-
port for the accused's constitutional right is weakening. That pro-
nouncement came in the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Montana
v. Egelhoff. 257 In Egelhoff the Court considered a Montana statute which
declared that voluntary intoxication "may not be taken into considera-
tion in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element
of [a criminal] offense." 2" The accused claimed that the statute was
unconsti tutional.
A five-Justice majority voted to uphold the statute. One of the five,
Justice Ginsburg, conceptualized the statute as a substantive rule of
criminal law and underscored that states have wide latitude in defin-
25° Id. at 302.
251
 SO! Robert Weisberg, Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory
Process Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 Si'.AN L. REv. 935,935-36 (1978);
see generally IMIVINKELRIED, SUPra note 28, § 10-4-5,250-72.
252 See IMWINKI;LRIED, SUPra note 28, § 10-5.1.), at 257.
253 See id. § 10-5.c, at 257-50.
254 See id. § l 0-5.d, at 259-61.
255 See id. §	 at 266-69.
266 See id. § 10-5.a, at 254-56.
267 See generally 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996).
258 Id. at 2016 (considering MoNT. Cone ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995)).
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ing the elements of their crimes. However, the four-Justice plurality
conceived of the statute as a restriction on the accused's ability to
introduce evidence of intoxication. The plurality emphasized that the
accused has the burden of showing the unconstitutionality of an evi-
dentiary restriction. The plurality acknowledged Chambers but seemed
to limit its precedential value, characterizing Chambers as a "highly
case-specific error correction" based on "a fact-intensive" analysis of
the precise facts of the case. Although the Egelhoff opinion is signed
by only four Justices, Egelhoff may be an indication that, in the future,
it will be more difficult for defendants to convince the Court to apply
the Washington
-
Chambers line of authority to override otherwise valid
limitations on the admissibility of exculpatory evidence.
C. The Constitutionality of Applying a Rape Shield Statute to Bar
Exculpatory Unconscious Transference Evidence
Like the testimonial privileges, the rape shield laws rest on extrin-
sic social policy. The policy justification for privileges is that they
encourage certain desirable, out-of-court behavior between persons
standing in close family or professional relationships. 259 For example,
society wants clients to feel free to confide in their attorneys, and
without the assurance of an evidentiary privilege, people might be
unwilling to disclose sensitive information to their attorneys. 260 Like-
wise, the rape shield law is designed to affect out-of-court behavior.
Society wants rape victims to come forward and report the crimes
perpetrated against them. In this setting, the fear is that victims will
balk at doing so if they know that at the subsequent trial, their entire
sexual history will be spread on the public record.
However, if testimonial privileges can be attacked under the im-
plied constitutional right, a fortiori rape shield laws should be assail-
able on the identical theory. Initially, academic commentators raised
this possibility."' Later, the courts acknowledged that given the right
facts, an accused could rely on the implied right to invalidate the
application of a rape shield law blocking the admission of exculpatory
evidence."2
259 See? CARLSON EN AL., supra note 105, at 731-32.
2 '"' See id. at 771.
a 	 e.g., Nancy j. Brown, Note, The Illinois Rape Shield Statute: Will It Withstand Consti-
tutional Attack?, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 211,214; j. Alexander Tanford & Anthonyj. Bocchino, Rape
Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA, L. Ittiv. 544,545 (1980).
21'2 See 1MWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 9-4.b, at 223-33.
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In most cases, though, the courts have balanced these considera-
tions in favor of the rape shield law.2"3 When a rape shield law and the
accused's implied right have collided, the rape shield statute has ordi-
narily emerged the victor. The Supreme Court has remarked that "rape
victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment,
and unnecessary invasions of privacy."2" However, the statutes have
yielded to the accused's constitutional right in a minority of cases in
which the exculpatory evidence has extraordinary probative value.
These cases tend to fall into two lines of authority.
In one line of authority, defense arguments have succeeded be-
cause, on the specific facts of the case, the defense could construct a
tenable argument that the complainant's sexual history was relevant to
show the complainant's intense bias against the accusec1. 21i5
 In one case,
the accused claimed that he had discovered that the complainant had
attempted to seduce his son. 2"" He was prepared to testify that he had
confronted the complainant with his discovery and threatened to dis-
close her misconduct to her parents.2" The accused's theory was that
this confrontation supplied a powerful motivation for her to fabricate
a rape charge against him. 268
Traditionally, American evidence law has assumed that evidence
of bias has special probative value. Bias impeachment has a "high
position ... in the hierarchy of impeachment techniques ...." 2"9 "[I] n
the minds of many courts, it is the most probative impeachment tech-
nique."270 On cross-examination, courts permit "an especially broad
scope of inquiry" about bias. 271
 Although courts confine some impeach-
ment techniques to cross-examination and bar extrinsic evidence of
the impeaching fact,272 as a matter of course they countenance the
introduction of extrinsic evidence establishing a witness's bias. 273
263 See id. !Li 9-4.a, at 222 11.106 (collecting cases); Smith, supra note 27, at 287.
2" Michigan v. Lucas, 50{} U.S. 145,150 (1991).
26!' See ImwmualuED, supra note 28, § 8-7.d, at 200-01 (citing State v..Jalo, 557 l'.2d 1359
(Or. 1976) and Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1981)).
vs n See jalo, 557 P.2d at 1360.
267
 See id.
268 See id.
20John K. Schmertz & Karen S. Czapanskiy, Bias Impeachment and the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence, 61 GEO. L.J. 257,264 (1972).
27(1 CARLSON E'1• Al„, supra note 105, at 351.
271 Id,
272 See id. at 377-81 (collateral fact rule).
275 See id. at 351.
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The Supreme Court evidently shares the assumption that evidence
of bias is highly probative. In Davis v. Alaska, the accused was charged
with a burglary:27' The accused wanted to introduce evidence of the
bias of the star prosecution witness. 275 At the time of trial, the witness
was on probation for a juvenile theft offense.276
 There was a forceful
inference of bias on the witness's part.277
 As a probationer, the witness
understandably had a motivation to curry the prosecution's favor. 278
Furthermore, the witness had previously been found guilty of a theft
offense similar to the charge the accused was facing; if the accused was
not convicted, the finger of guilt might point toward the witness. 279
However, a state statute and court rule cloaked juvenile proceedings
with confidentiality. 28° On the basis of the statute and rule, the prose-
cution obtained a pre-trial order precluding the defense from ques-
tioning the witness about his probationary status. 281 The Supreme
Court held that the excluded evidence had such substantial probative
value that the exclusion was unconstitutional. 282
Can the defense attorney proffering testimony about a source
monitoring error analogize to Davis? Does that testimony possess the
same probative value as the bias evidence in Davis? Most psychologists
would probably vouch that the general concept of source monitoring
errors is even more widely accepted 283
 than the narrow theory of
unconscious transference. There is also more empirical support for the
former concept although none of the experiments involves victims of
sexual assault.284 Nevertheless, Davis is distinguishable. To be specific,
when the accused merely denies committing the actus reus and invokes
the source monitoring concept to justify introducing evidence of the
complainant's sexual conduct with third parties, the evidence has
markedly less probative value than the facts creating the irresistible
inference of bias in Davis.
As Section II demonstrated, even when the conditions for uncon-
scious transference proper are ideal, the expert can testify only to the
possibility that transference occurred. Likewise, when the thrust of the
274 415 U.S. 308,309-10 (1974).
275 See id. at 311.
276 See id.
277 See id.
278 See a
278 See Davis, 415 U.S. at 311.
280 See.
281 See id.
282 /d, at 318.
283
 Seeichnson et. al., supra note 95, at 3.
284 See.	 (collecting the studies).
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defense is a denial of the actus reus and the defense is invoking the
concept of source monitoring errors, all the expert can attest to is a
possibility that an error occurred.
As we have seen, one of the conditions for transference proper is
the witness's weak memory of a detail of the event he or she is now
attempting to reca11. 285 The same condition is relevant in assessing the
probability that a source monitoring error has occurred. 286 Absent
special facts, there is no reason to believe that the complainant's
memory of the nature of his or her contact with the accused is likely
to be weak. It is true that witnesses often experience difficulty remem-
bering the details of traumatic events. 287 However, in this situation, the
defense theory is that the accused's encounter with the complainant
was innocent and licit. There is nothing about that type of encounter
which would make it especially hard for the complainant to remember
the character of the encounter. According to the defense's theory, the
encounter with the accused should not have been "mentally shock-
ing. ""8
Another factor enhancing the likelihood of transference proper
is similarity between the weakly remembered detail of the litigated
event and the supposedly confused detail from another event. 289 As we
shall see, that factor is also a determinant of the probability that the
witness has committed a source monitoring error. 296 This factor is
absent here. If the accused had an innocent encounter with the com-
plainant but the complainant was raped or assaulted by a third party,
there are obvious differences between the encounter and the assault.
When the two events in memory are dissimilar, the conditions are less
than ideal for a monitoring error. 291 The similarity between the events
serves as a retrieval cue. 292 That cue is missing here. If similarity of
context is highly relevant in assessing the probability of an error, 2""
error seems improbable. 294 Even if one accepts arguendo the validity
285 See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
286 See Johnson et ;i1., supra note 95, at 6-8.
287
	 YARMEY, supra note 11, at 71-72, Freud 	 proposed a repression theory, and clinicians
tend to accept the theory. See id. at 71. Experimental psychologists, however, remain dubious. See
id. "Laboratory experiments testing the ... [theory] . have in most cases failed to support the
theory ... ." Id. at 71-72; see also Levine & Tapp, supra note 2, at 1097,1100.
288 See Loreus & Dovr.F., supra note 39, § 2.12, at 44-47.
289 See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
299 SeeJohnson et al., supra note 95, at 6-8.	 '
291 See McGoucar, supra note 38, at 43,
292 See Ross et al., supra note 29, at 88.
29,9 See id. at 97.
291 Some students of transference assert that "it is very unlikely that unconscious transference
will occur in actual criminal trials." Id. at 84.
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of the source monitoring theory, the conditions are not ripe for an
error to occur. Thus, testimony about the theory would possess less
probative worth than the evidence of intense bias, which has been held
to trigger the accused's constitutional right and override the rape
shield laws. The first line of authority would therefore be distinguish-
able.
There is a second line of authority to which the accused might
analogize in an attempt to defeat the rape shield laws. In these cases,
the defense offered evidence of a youthful complainant's other sexual
activity to explain the complainant's knowledge of sexual matters—
knowledge that the jurors might otherwise treat as corroboration of
the allegation that there was sexual contact on the charged occasions''
There are numerous cases upholding the admission of evidence on
this theory. 296
 The courts in these cases reasoned that jurors tend to
assume that a young child is ignorant of sexual matters:4'7 On that
assumption, the jurors might regard the child's ability to recount a
sexual encounter as some evidence that the encounter occurred. 29' The
courts permitted the accused to prove the child's encounters with third
parties in which the child might have learned the sexual facts that the
child attributes to his or her contact with the accused. 299
At present, the lower courts are split over the question of whether
this theory of logical relevance is potent enough to surmount a rape
shield law."° Maine, Nevada and New Hampshire courts have em-
braced this theory."U 1
 According to one commentator, these liberal
decisions represent the trend in the case law."2
 However, there are
conservative decisions from Iowa and Michigan rejecting the theory. 303
Furthermore, there is a third, compromise view, followed in such states
as Arizona, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin."' The courts in these juris-
dictions carefully scrutinize the quantum of the probative value of the
evidence. Hence, they might grant the accused a right to introduce
evidence of the complainant child's sexual contact with a third party
295
 See IMWINKELRIED, Supra note 28, § 9-4.1), at 224-25.
296 See id. (collecting cases decided prior to 1990); NORMAN M. GARLAND & EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE: THE ACCUSED'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INTRODUCE
FAVORABLE EVIDENCE § 94.b, at 56-57 (1996 Stipp.) (collecting most recent cases).
297 See iMWINEELRIED, supra note 28, § 9-4.b, at 224-25.
298 See id.
299 See id.
3<)° See generally Christopher B. Reid, The Sexual Innocence Inference Theory as a Basis for the
Admissibility of a Child Molestation Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct, 91 Micit. L. REv. 827 (1903).
" See id. at 842-44.
3°2 See id. at 831-32.
5°3 See id. at 845-46.
5°4 See id. at 847-48.
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if the sexual conduct in question was not only unusual but also strik-
ingly similar to the alleged contact with the accused."5
There are several parallels between this line of authority and a
proffer of evidence of a source monitoring error. In both situations,
the defense is attempting to introduce evidence of the complainant's
other sexual conduct—evidence seemingly barred by the rape shield
law. Further, in both situations, the theory of logical relevance is plau-
sible. Just as the child's encounter with a third party could explain the
child's sexual knowledge, the adult victim might be unconsciously
transferring part of the memory of a sexual contact with a third party
to the recollection of a meeting with the accused. Finally, in both
situations, typically the evidence permits the jury to infer at most that
the complainant's testimony might be mistaken; an encounter with a
third party could be the source of the child's sexual knowledge and,
similarly, an adult's sexual encounter with a third party might trigger
a source monitoring error. The most liberal cases in this line of author-
ity hold that the probative value of the child's encounter is enough to
override the rape shield law. The accused can argue that a fortiori, the
theory of source monitoring errors possesses enough probative worth
to surmount a rape shield statute.
On the merits, the compromise view taken by the courts in Ari-
zona, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin is the soundest. 306 Those courts
direct the trial judge to carefully evaluate the quantum of the probative
value of the proffered evidence. At a fundamental level, the liberal and
conservative views misconceive the nature of the Washington
- Chambers
doctrine. Under Washington and Chambers, the trial judge must en-
gage in as-applied analysis. 307
 The judge should conduct a case-specific,
fact-intensive assessment of both the probative value of the proffered
evidence and the countervailing considerations. Given the as-applied
nature of the analysis, it is a mistake for the courts to either blanketly
endorse or sweepingly reject a theory of admissibility which conflicts
with the rape shield laws.
As a properly enacted statute, a rape shield law enjoys a presump-
tion of constitutionality, and it is incumbent on the accused to rebut
that presumption:" In Egelhoff; the plurality described the accused's
burden as a "heavy" one.'''' If there are only generic similarities be-
tween her description of the charged rape and the complainant's
""5 See Reid, supra note 300, at 847-48.
:IN See id.
9U7 See 1M WINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 2-3.a, at 34.
3"14 See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017.
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sexual encounter with the third party, the rape shield law should
probably trump the accused's right to introduce testimony about a
possible source monitoring error. In the exceptional case, though,
when the complainant describes an aberrant sexual assault and the
encounter with the third party is strikingly similar to the described
assault, the accused's right should be paramount.
IV. CONCLUSION
As previously stated, prosecutors as well as defense counsel can
have occasion to proffer testimony about unconscious transference.
Moreover, a civil litigant might find it useful to introduce such testi-
mony. Like a criminal accused, a civil defendant could take the position
that the plaintiff is mistakenly transferring a detail of a tortious en-
counter with a third party to the recollection of a contact with the
defendant. Thus, the proponent of transference evidence could be the
prosecution, the accused or a civil party.
When the proponent begins to research the admissibility of the
evidence, the proponent will discover that there is general agreement
in psychological circles that the phenomenon of unconscious transfer-
ence does occur. In particular, when an accused relies on unconscious
transference proper (conceding that the complainant was victimized
but claiming that complainant has mistakenly transferred a memory
of the accused's face to the recollection of the victimization), the only
hurdles are the standards for admitting scientific testimony and the
balancing test of Rule 403. As we have seen, in many jurisdictions, "soft"
scientific evidence testimony about unconscious transference would be
exempt from Frye scrutiny. Moreover, Rule 403 has a pronounced bias
in favor of admitting logically relevant evidence. Rule 403 sends trial
judges the message that whenever they are in doubt as to whether the
probative value of an item of evidence outstrips the incidental proba-
tive dangers, they should resolve the doubt in favor of accepting the
evidence. 310 Thus, in the fact situation discussed in Section II, at least
in Frye jurisdictions, the trial judge might well decide to admit the
testimony about transference proper.
In the fact pattern described in Section III, however, the analysis
can be fundamentally different. Here the introduction of the proffered
evidence about source monitoring errors can conflict with the rape
shield laws. Of course, even here a conflict is not inevitable. The expert
might be basing his or her opinion on a foundation other than the
316 Edward J. linwinkelried, When in Doubt, Admit, CAL. LAw., Dec. 1990, at 72.
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victim's prior sexual conduct. Suppose, for example, that the inde-
pendent basis for the expert's opinion is a suggestive police interview
of the victim or the victim's exposure to suggestive statements in a
group therapy session. Here the expert could elaborate on the basis
for the opinion without referring to any conduct covered by a rape
shield statute. Furthermore, even if such conduct was part of the basis
of the expert's opinion, the defense might be content to invite the
expert to give only a very general description of the basis of the
opinion. By doing so, the defense could largely moot the collision
between the evidence and the rape shield law. The downside, however,
is that doing so would render the evidence more vulnerable to a Rule
403 objection. The very vagueness of the description of the opinion's
basis would both diminish the facial relevance of the evidence and
magnify the risk of jury speculation—considerations the trial judge
may factor into the Rule 403 balancing test.
The starkest conflict arises, though, when the defense wants to
elicit the witness's explicit description of the victim's other sexual
conduct as the basis for an opinion about a source monitoring error.
Unless the accused can persuade the judge that the proffered evidence
fits within one of the exceptions carved out on the face of' the rape
shield statute, the statute purports to absolutely bar the admission of
the evidence. While Rule 403 encourages the trial judge to admit any
logically relevant evidence, most rape shield statutes direct the judge
to exclude evidence of the alleged victim's other sexual experiences in
this fact pattern.
The accused can sometimes rely on an implied constitutional right
to surmount exclusionary rules of evidence such as rape shield laws.
When the victim describes an unusual sexual encounter and the vic-
tim's contact with a third party is strikingly similar to the described
encounter, the accused has an effective analogy to justify invoking the
constitutional right. Many courts have held the accused's right para-
mount in the analogous cases involving child complainants.
However, in the typical case, it is unlikely that the accused can
persuade a judge that his or her constitutional right mandates the
introduction of exculpatory testimony about a source monitoring error
based on evidence of the alleged victim's other sexual conduct. In
Egelhell the plurality made it more difficult for an accused to suc-
cessfully invoke the constitutional right fashioned in Washington and
Chambers. Moreover, in recent years, society's commitment to the poli-
3L I See generally Montana v. Egelholf, 116 S. 0. 2013 (1906).
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cies inspiring the rape shield laws has intensified. In 1991, the Supreme
Court expressed its sympathy with those policies.312 In 1994, Congress
enlisted in the national campaign against sexual assault by selectively
abolishing the character evidence prohibition in rape prosecutions. In
that year, Congress approved Federal Rule of Evidence 413 allowing
prosecutors to introduce evidence of an accused's uncharged sexual
misconduct to prove the accused's propensity to commit rape." The
simultaneous depreciation of the accused's Sixth Amendment right
and the intensification of the national campaign against sexual assault
will make the defense's constitutional attack on the rape shield laws an
uphill battle. Until the Court decides to attach greater weight to the
accused's constitutional right or new scientific research yields a reliable
method of determining when source monitoring errors are probable
rather than merely possible, the defense seems destined to lose that
battle.
312 Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991).
913 See IMWINKELRIEI), supra note 172, § 2:22, at 86-87 (Supp. 1996).
